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Note. Extracts from this interview were published in Arabic in An Nahar al’arabî wa addûwalî on 
August 26, 1979.1 We have here simply retranscribed the complete recording. We have chosen 
not to mask the lacunae of the archive, and we have kept the markers of orality (partial syntax, 
hesitations, ends of sentences that trail off, turns in the conversation due to fatigue or technical 
problems). On the one hand, the goal is to make the status of the text unambiguous: Foucault did 
not re-read it before publication, unlike the other interviews gathered in Dits et écrits. On the 
other hand, we did not want to take away the emotion that comes from following the contours of 
a thought in the process of working itself out. 
ù 
Farès Sassine: Let’s talk about Iran. Close to ten months have passed since you first took up a 
position on the Iranian revolution, right? At first, your position scandalised the French intellec-
tual scene, and afterwards it left a strong impression there. In those ten months, we’ve witnessed 
the departure of the sovereign of Iran and the attempt by the mullahs to set up a government, a 
possibility you yourself had evoked, while refusing to reduce the Iranian uprising2 to it. Elsewhere 
                                                        
1 This interview appeared for the first time in its original language (French) in February of 2013, in the se-
cond issue of the journal Rodéo. We reproduce here the translation of the French editors’ introductory re-
marks. We are deeply grateful to Farès Sassine and to Rodéo for having generously authorized the publica-
tion of Alex Feldman’s English translation of the interview. This translation was first published in Laura 
Cremonesi, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli (eds.), Foucault and the Making of Subjects 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. 25–51.  
2 [Translator’s note: soulèvement. The term occurs more than 50 times in this interview, not including related 
forms such as se soulever and se lever (to rise up, to get up or stand up). Foucault is obviously exploring the 
notion developed in detail in “Inutile de se soulever?” Le Monde 10661 (1979), 1–2, reprinted in Dits et écrits 
2: 1976–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (2001), 790–797 (hereafter abbreviated DE 2). In Power: 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion (2000), 449–453, this essay is translated under 
the title “Useless to Revolt?” and the term soulèvement is consistently rendered as ‘revolt’. A more recent 
translation by Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, included as an appendix in Janet Afary and Kevin B. 
Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islam (2005), 263–267, renders the 
title “Is It Useless to Revolt?” but this time translates soulèvement as ‘uprising’. Although Foucault does not 
explicitly distinguish soulèvement and révolte, he obviously favours the first term, which is related to (se) 
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in the world, there was the uprising in Nicaragua, the drama of the refugees from Indochina… 
Perhaps it’s time to evaluate, in hindsight, the various positions you’ve taken on Iran. What first 
led you to be interested in Iran? 
Michel Foucault: Quite simply, I read a book. It’s nothing new, but I hadn’t read it 
yet. Thanks to an accident and a period of convalescence, I had the time to read it care-
fully last summer. It’s Ernst Bloch’s book, The Principle of Hope.3 It really left an impres-
sion on me because, after all, the book remains rather unknown in France, and it’s had 
relatively little influence. And yet it seems to me that the problem it poses is absolutely 
crucial. I mean, the problem of that collective perception of history that begins to emerge 
in Europe during the Middle Ages, most likely. It involves perceiving another world 
here below, perceiving that the reality of things is not definitively established and set in 
place, but instead, in the very midst of our time and our history, there can be an open-
ing, a point of light drawing us towards it that gives us access, from this world itself, to 
a better world. Now, this perception of history is at once a point of departure for the 
idea of revolution and, on the other hand, an idea with a religious origin. Religious 
groups and especially dissident religious groups were basically the ones who held this 
idea—that within the world of the here-below, something like a revolution was possible. 
Yes, that’s it. Well, this theme really interested me because I think it’s true historically, 
even if Ernst Bloch doesn’t really demonstrate all that in a very satisfying way, in terms 
of the methods of academic history. I think it’s an idea that is, all the same… 
FS: We owe the idea to the sixteenth century, but in particular to religious groups. 
MF: Oh, it begins well before the sixteenth century, since in the end the great popular 
revolts of the Middle Ages were already organized around this theme. It begins in the 
twelfth or thirteenth century, but obviously it blows up around the fifteenth or sixteenth 
century, and it cuts across all the wars of religion. So, well, I was in the middle of read-
ing about all that when the newspapers informed me that something like an uprising 
was taking place in Iran. And this uprising stood out because it wasn’t obviously gov-
erned by a Western revolutionary ideology, it wasn’t governed or directed by a political 
party either, not even by political organizations—it truly was a mass uprising. An entire 
people was standing up against a system in power. And in the end the importance of the 
religious aspect, of religious institutions, of religious representation was… [inaudible]. 
So, it seemed to me that there was a relationship between what I was reading and what 
was taking place. And I wanted to go and see. And I really went to see it as an example, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
lever, to raise, to rise, whereas ‘revolt’ suggests a mere turning around and is closer etymologically to révo-
lution, against which soulèvement is pitted in the essay in Le Monde. The Trésor de la Langue Française 
informatisé notes that soulèvement can also mean a collective expression of indignation or excitement, as in 
un soulèvement de l’opinion publique (Guizot)—an outcry of public opinion (‘Soulèvement’, Centre National 
de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, accessed 15 January 2016, 
http://cnrtl.fr/definition/soul%C3%A8vement). We have tried as much as possible to use ‘uprising’, ‘rising 
up’ and ‘rise up’ in the translation of this interview.]  
3 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung I-III (1954–1959)/The Principle of Hope (1986). The French translation 
began to be published under Gallimard in 1976. Volumes II and III appeared in 1982 and 1991; the three 
volumes were translated from the German by Françoise Wuilmart. 
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a test of what I was reading in Ernst Bloch. There you have it. So, you could say, I went 
there with one eye conditioned by this problem of the relationship between political 
revolution and religious hope or eschatology. All right. 
FS: And starting from this way of seeing things—a vision that was theoretical, at first—did 
you go to Iran just one time? 
MF: No, twice.  
FS: You went there two times? 
MF: For five weeks in total, as it turns out, five or six weeks. 
FS: And did you meet a large sample of people there?  
MF: Large? You know the people I would have been able to meet, as a Westerner, and 
in a moment like that. In other words, I obviously saw the academic areas of Teheran. In 
Teheran I saw a certain number of young men and women who were not part or were 
no longer part of the university and who were, shall we say, active in the revolutionary 
movement at that moment. I met some but finally quite few representatives from the 
political class. I met a certain number of people who would go on to become important 
figures in the new regime, such as Dr. Mehdi Bazargan or Dr. Kazem Sami Kermani.4 
FS: Right. 
MF: And then I went to Qom, where I met Shariatmadari.5 After that, I went to Aba-
dan, where I met a small group of workers [inaudible]. I also met some people from the 
civil service in Teheran. Of course, I absolutely did not see what was happening in the 
provinces. 
FS: Only the big cities then. 
MF: So I only know… I’ve only seen things in Teheran, Qom, and Abadan. 
FS: And once you were there, what was distinctive about the case of Iran? Did it confirm or 
go against your conclusions? 
MF: Well, I believe that at that moment, and in much of the European analysis of the 
situation (or in France at any rate), there was this idea that ultimately the erosion of cul-
                                                        
4 The engineer Mehdi Bazargan was the founder of the Freedom Movement of Iran in 1961 and of the Irani-
an Human Rights Association in 1977. Named prime minister by Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Te-
heran, he remained in this position for just a few months (5 February–5 November 1979) because of his 
liberal and democratic ideas. Kazem Sami Kermani, doctor and psychiatrist, led the Iranian National Liber-
ation Movement (JAMA), which was allied with Bazargan’s Movement and affiliated with the National 
Front of Iran. He was the minister of health in the Bazargan government.  
5 An Ayatollah who was considered to be the first among peers, Shariatmadari was for the separation of 
mosques and the state, and he was very interested in social and economic problems. In the words of Olivier 
Roy, he ‘was literally “defrocked” by Khomeini’. See Sabrina Mervin, Les mondes chi’ites et l’Iran (2007), 39. 
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ture [déculturation] in Iran under the influence of the dictatorial regime of the Shah, the 
overly hasty industrialization according to a Western model that was imposed too 
quickly, this erosion of culture had led—and then the disorganization too, the political 
disorganization—all of this had led to Islam’s becoming in a way the minimum common 
vocabulary in which the Iranian people were expressing their claims, claims that were 
basically social and political. Put differently, since they weren’t capable of having a 
revolutionary discourse, a revolutionary ideology, a revolutionary organization in the 
Western sense of the term, well then, they would have withdrawn into Islam. That was 
an interpretation that I’ve heard many times; it was being reported all around me, but I 
believed it to be erroneous. Because it seemed to me that it wasn’t some kind of mere 
vehicle, that in this movement Islam was not a mere vehicle for aspirations or ideologies 
that, at the bottom, were different. It wasn’t just for want of anything better that Islam 
was being used to mobilise Muslims. I believe that there was indeed in this movement—
a movement that was quite broadly popular, millions and millions of people accepting 
to go up against an army and a police force that were obviously all powerful—it seemed 
to me that there was something there that owed its force to… what you could call a… a 
will at once both political and religious, a bit like what occurred in Europe in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries when the Anabaptists both revolted against the political 
power they were facing and drew the force and the vocabulary of their revolts from a 
religious belief, a profound and sincere religious aspiration. There you go, that’s what I 
was trying to say. 
FS: All right, now I’m going to ask you a few questions about your principal notions. I mean, 
those ideas that, I think, constituted the base of the theoretical issues that concerned you in Iran. I 
have in mind basically three concepts (let me know if there were others): the general will, Islamic 
government, and political spirituality. Let’s consider these three. So, what struck you, especially 
at the beginning, was the existence of a general will borne by a people. You say that you believed 
such a will was an abstraction, that it existed only, like God, in books, and yet there you saw it on 
the ground.6  
MF: As a European, I’ve always, you could say, seen the general will delegated, rep-
resented, or confiscated by a political class, by political organizations, or by political 
leaders. And I believe that—let’s be cynical here for a moment—the claim that de Gaulle 
represented France in 1940 is perhaps a fact, but I know well, even if I was a child then, 
that the general will of the French didn’t lie in that direction [laughter]. France’s being 
represented by de Gaulle was, shall we say, something politically desirable and histori-
cally fertile, but in reality it’s not at all like that that things happened [laughter]. In our 
democracies, where deputies, ministers, presidents of the Republic speak in the name of 
the collectivity, of the state, and of society, the general will is all the same something we 
rarely feel.  
FS: Yes, but…  
                                                        
6 [Editors’ note: see Michel Foucault, “L’esprit d’un monde sans esprit,” in Iran: la révolution au nom de Dieu, 
ed. Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet (1979), reprinted in DE 2, 746–747/“Iran: The Spirit of a World without 
Spirit”, in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 252–253.]  
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MF: And in the political groups that claim to carry the fundamental aspirations of the 
population, you find a good deal of bureaucracy, of leadership, of hierarchy, a good deal 
of confiscation of power, etc. Now, it seemed to me, rightly or wrongly—and maybe I 
was entirely mistaken on this—that when the Iranians went out in the streets in Septem-
ber and stood before the tanks, they were doing that not because they were forced or 
constrained by someone. It wasn’t a group who was taking the risk for them on the 
grounds that this group held the key to their identity; no, it was they themselves, they 
didn’t want, they no longer wanted to put up with the regime. And so, even if I didn’t 
go to the provinces, I believe that this was something that touched everyone, as you 
could see it in Teheran and a bit everywhere in Iran, according to what [inaudible] says in 
any case. Collectively, people wanted no more of it.  
FS: And what characterised this general will? What was it based on? Only on the refusal of 
the sovereign?  
MF: Well, there you have indeed the most difficult part to discuss. We could of 
course just say to ourselves that they no longer wanted that regime, that this general will 
boiled down to that. Now I believe, and perhaps I’m wrong here, that in fact they want-
ed something else. And this something else that they wanted, it was precisely neither 
another political regime nor a regime of mullahs more or less implicitly; what they 
wanted, what they had in the back of their heads or, you might say, what they’d set their 
sight on when they risked their lives in these protests—it seems to me that what they 
were after was a kind of eschatology. You could say that the form this general will took 
was not a will for a state or a political organization; it was, so it seems to me, a sort of 
religious eschatology.  
FS: …that would also be realised on earth?  
MF: Yes, you might say that this was what ultimately gave form and force to their 
will. It wasn’t just a refusal of the current regime, a disgust in the face of the disarray, 
the waste, the corruption, the police, and the massacres. Right. This will also took shape, 
and it was by and large a religious eschatology. 
FS: With respect to Islamic government, you say in your ‘Open Letter to Mehdi Bazargan’7 
that we’ve already said enough about the word ‘government’. While the word ‘Islamic’ itself 
doesn’t scare you, you say that between these two terms there could be a ‘reconciliation, contra-
diction, or the threshold of something new’.8 Can you elaborate on these different possibilities and 
maybe say something about which of them is coming about?  
                                                        
7 Michel Foucault, “Lettre ouverte à Mehdi Bazargan,” Le Nouvel Observateur 753 (1979), 46, reprinted in DE 
2, 780–782/“Open Letter to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,” in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Irani-
an Revolution, 260–263. 
8 “In this will for an ‘Islamic government’, should one see a reconciliation, a contradiction or the threshold 
of something new?” (Michel Foucault, “À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?” Le Nouvel Observateur 727 (1978), re-
printed in DE 2, 694/“What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?” in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the 
Iranian Revolution, 208.) 
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MF: All right, well, I think that this notion of Islamic government is indeed fairly am-
biguous. And truth be told, when I posed the question—because everyone was talking 
to me about Islamic government, from Sami Kermani to Shariatmadari, and including 
Mehdi Bazargan too—everyone was telling me [inaudible] that what people want is an 
Islamic government. And, when you asked them what that consisted of, the answer was 
very vague, very hazy. And, even when it was underwritten by Shariatmadari’s promise 
to do this or that, it wasn’t very reassuring: it’s not because people say ‘We’ll respect 
minorities’ or ‘We’ll even tolerate the communists’ that you should rest assured. I even 
think we should be worried when we hear that kind of thing. But that’s not all there is to 
it. It seems to me that by Islamic government, people, as a mass, were looking for, were 
thinking about something that was essentially and ultimately a non-political form of 
coexistence, a way of living together [vivre ensemble], one that in no way resembles what 
we could call a Western political structure. Now, it was likely untenable in that form. 
Naturally, the risk was that this would all end up in a government in the hands of the 
mullahs. And, when I said, is this a contradiction or a possibility that we’re on the brink 
of something new, I meant, is it possible, on the basis of something that is in itself so 
ambiguous, so hazy, something that risks falling straightaway into a government of the 
mullahs—is it possible to elaborate something from this? And, will the circumstances, 
the pressures of all kinds, political, economic, military, diplomatic, will all that allow 
Iran to work out a solution? It seems to me that there was at least one point in common 
among everyone, when people were talking about Islamic government, whether it was 
the workers from Abadan, Shariatmadari or Bazargan. And this point in common was 
that they were trying to find forms of coexistence, forms of social existence, forms of 
equality, etc. that didn’t follow the Western model.  
FS: Could we call that, without referring to anyone in particular, a sort of stateless society 
[société sans État]?  
MF: If you’d like to, yes, sure, absolutely. Absolutely. Once more, everything was 
very vague and it was necessarily very confused.  
FS: But does Islam, which is generally presented and which presents itself at time as both a re-
ligion and a state, does this religion that presents itself as a summum of the doctrine of power not 
carry in itself the possibility of the limitation of every power of the state?  
MF: At any rate, that’s what people were always telling me when I was there. And I 
was assured that Islam being what it is, it couldn’t in itself harbour any of the dangers 
that are inherent to the subtle, reflected, balanced forms of a Western democracy. That’s 
what I was told. Anyway, I found this sort of hope that, once again, is so similar in its 
form to what you find in Europe in the sixteenth century. It seems to me that this is…  
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FS: Well, let’s move on to a notion that hasn’t exactly got people clamouring to give you flow-
ers [laughter]: political spirituality.9 Could you say a bit about how one politicises the spiritual 
and spiritualises politics?  
MF: You know, one day without a doubt I’ll write a study on the incredible reactions 
of the French with respect to my position about Iran. I don’t know how people reacted 
in other countries in Europe, but in France it was all quite mad. It was an example of 
something that… people were really beside themselves. You know, for three different 
journalists, who certainly aren’t mediocre, to end up fabricating things about my own 
texts and then attributing that to me… And in the end, they made this stuff up, with 
sentences that I hadn’t written, with texts that didn’t come from me, with words that 
weren’t my own, attributing them to me in order to demonstrate I approved of the exe-
cutions of Jews, that it could be said that I approved the actions of the Islamic tribunals, 
etc. In respectable newspapers. So, in the end, people went mad.  
FS: How do you explain that madness?  
MF: Well that’s something I would really like to talk to you about. I don’t have an ex-
planation. And again the other day, yesterday, I saw a journalist from a paper, a weekly, 
someone I met in Iran, and I asked, ‘How do you explain the attitude of your col-
leagues?’ He’s Jewish, and he told me: ‘Oh, I think that it’s the hatred of Islam.’  
FS: There’s a book, I’m citing it because I reviewed it last week in the paper. It’s called Orien-
talism…10  
MF: Right. By Edward Said. I know Edward Said. I know the book.  
FS: Ah, you know Edward Said!  
MF: Yes, it’s a really interesting book. Well, ultimately I don’t know, in any case, 
people went mad. The sentence I wrote concerning political spirituality was this: I said 
that what I had found over there was something like the search for a political spirituali-
ty, and I said that this notion, which is now entirely obscure for us, was entirely clear 
and familiar in the sixteenth century.11 OK, there’s no reason to get worked up about 
that. Instead, you might tell me: ‘It’s not true, they’re not seeking a political spirituality.’ 
But to go and say, as was said recently in Le Monde…  
FS: Claude Roy?  
                                                        
9 [Editors’ note: in his writings on the Iranian Revolution, Foucault uses this expression only once, in the 
conclusion of his article “À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?”, 694/“What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?”, 209, 
which reads: “The other question concerns this little corner of the earth whose land, both above and below 
the surface, has strategic importance at a global level. For the people who inhabit this land, what is the 
point of searching, even at the cost of their own lives, for this thing whose possibility we [Westerners] have 
forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity, a political spirituality. I can already hear 
the French laughing, but I know that they are wrong.”] 
10 Edward Said, Orientalism (1978). The book was translated into French in 1980. 
11 [Editors’ note: see note 9.] 
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MF: Claude Roy.12 It’s an enormous lie. And they’ve never apologised for it and they 
never will. But it will always affect me. I’ve never personally aspired, whatever they say, 
to a political spirituality. I said that over there I saw a very curious movement, very bi-
zarre, something I believe we can’t understand except by analogy with things that hap-
pened here [inaudible] political spirituality. You have a superb example of it, which we 
haven’t entirely forgotten since it still has a certain contemporary relevance for us: Cal-
vinism. What is Calvin if not a will to convey not simply a religious belief, not simply a 
religious organization, but an entire form of spirituality, that is, an individual relation-
ship to God and to spiritual values, to convey all that into politics? Well, Calvinism, 
that’s what its project was, [inaudible] religious movement. That’s what happened in the 
West. That’s what took place in the West and it’s what, or so it seems to me, was in the 
movement of 1978 in Iran. Personally, [laughter] I’ve never thought that political spiritu-
ality could currently be, how to put it, an aspiration…  
FS: An answer.  
MF: …a possible or desirable answer or aspiration in the West. We’re a thousand 
leagues from it. The best proof that we’re a thousand leagues from it is that we have to 
make historical references in order to try to make it understandable. Second, I never 
claimed that political spirituality was the solution, even to the problems of Iran. Just re-
member what happened in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: things don’t 
turn out as we’d expect, and what happened led to some rough things. Political spiritu-
ality was never paradise on earth. Look at Calvin and his political spirituality: some 
people got burned at the stake [laughter]. OK, there you go. To put it differently, I de-
scribed something I saw in Iran. Maybe I was wrong, and I accept that we could argue 
about it. But to want to impute to me, as a personal aspiration, what I was describing as 
a will or an aspiration proper to Iran (or so it seems to me)—that comes down to a dis-
honesty [inaudible].  
FS: But, all the same, you described the movement sympathetically?  
MF: [Silence]  
FS: No, I say that…  
MF: Absolutely.  
FS: …because the positions you took were a great comfort for us in the context of the hostility 
you yourself describe to this revolution. You were the only one to say something truly new in the 
way of analysis, by saying that those who were going out into the streets weren’t fanatics, and 
that it was the return of Islam…  
MF: Yes, right, you can say, on the one hand, because I don’t believe you can ever 
understand something well if you’re hostile to it. And if I had had a feeling of hostility 
                                                        
12 [Editors’ note: see Claude Roy, “Les débordements du divin”, Le Monde 10717 (1979).] 
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about all that, I would never have gone there because I certainly wouldn’t have under-
stood it. Second, it seems to me in fact that there’s a risk, at any rate a possibility that 
now, in the countries called ‘Third World’, violent and intense revolutionary move-
ments of social and political change will try to take hold more and more on the cultural 
basis of these countries, rather than trying to model themselves on the West, the liberal 
or Marxist West. I think that’s what risks spreading. What’s in the process of spreading. 
In Afghanistan [inaudible] of that type [inaudible] Marxist [inaudible] an entire branch [in-
audible]. Right, it seems to me that we have… if only from a properly historical point of 
view, shall we say, we need to take seriously, to pay attention to what is happening. But, 
third and finally, if I had sympathy beyond this historical and political curiosity, it’s be-
cause I think in fact that, given what the Shah’s regime was, its political and economic 
oppression, its exploitation of the population and its masked imperialism, etc.—well, 
that an entire people should revolt against this regime is a good thing. And I’ll even say 
a very good thing: to the extent Islam at least allowed this, it’s because the people as a 
whole participated actively. They recognised themselves in it. It seems to me that this 
movement had echoes right down to the Iranian countryside in the sense that it referred 
to something that people recognised as theirs. Whereas if the movement had been made 
in the name of the class struggle, or in the name of freedoms, I’m not sure if it would 
have had the same echo or the same force. Those are the reasons why I was sympathetic, 
but this sympathy never went so far as to say that, one, we should imitate all that and, 
two, that what was going to come out of it would be paradise on earth—far from it, far 
from it. I simply made a judgement of reality about a force I’d noticed and whose im-
mediate objectives I couldn’t but subscribe to, since its immediate objectives were the 
overthrow of the imperialist regime, that regime of exploitation, of…  
FS: …massacres.  
MF: …that regime of police terror.  
FS: So—maybe we’ll have a chance to come back to this—you situate yourself entirely outside 
of the whole current that is called the return to the sacred?  
MF: Absolutely. I have never taken any position… I think, you might say, that for 
someone in the West… In any case, I, as a Westerner, consider that my attitude about 
religion isn’t anyone’s business, and I’ve never taken any public political stand or any 
public political position on the matter. I’ve never spoken about it. And I am, you could 
say, at the same time too historical and too relativist to have the absurd idea [laughter] to 
turn what I saw in Iran into the banner of a new prophetism: let’s return to the sacred 
[inaudible]. All that, in principle, it doesn’t concern me. At any rate, I’m not doing it. I 
tried to describe what I saw. The problem is to know why what was happening over 
there, the reality over there, constituted such a wound for the West. To the point that I, 
who was describing this reality, [inaudible] I could be considered a kind of fanatical 
prophet.  
FS: And you don’t have any explanation for why all of that happened?  
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MF: No, I continue to be very, very sceptical, very embarrassed by what is hap-
pening. When I talk to people, many of whom are, of course, somewhat close to me, 
many of them are completely nauseated by the incredible stupidity, the blindness with 
which journalists always [inaudible] absolutely the same thing about what’s happening 
in Iran. Here’s an entirely typical example: two months ago, on a peripheral radio sta-
tion, I heard the follow information: ‘The regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini has just 
cancelled the order of two Concorde airplanes or two nuclear power plants (I don’t 
know), but the government of Mr. Bazargan has assured that the contracts will be re-
spected.’ So, for the contracts that are respected, we have the Bazargan government, and 
for the cancelled contracts, it’s the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini [laughter]. Isn’t that 
sublime?  
FS: It is.  
MF: It sure is.  
FS: You’ve never met him personally?  
MF: The Ayatollah Khomeini? No. I didn’t meet him, for one, because what interested 
me, you might say, was to see what was happening there. I knew, first, that the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini wasn’t saying much. Besides, he was a political figure whose declarations 
were prepared in advance by his entourage and were supposed to have a certain politi-
cal meaning. I read what he had to say in the papers. I knew perfectly well that a con-
versation with him would lead to nothing. The problem once again was not to know 
what was in the heads of the leaders of the movement, but to know how those people 
who were literally making the revolution and making it, so it seems to me, on their own, 
were living.  
FS: And in that sense, to conclude this question a bit, could Islam play a role as a guarantee 
against despotism, as people said to you?  
MF: As people said to me… Well, listen: on that point personally I’m quite sceptical. 
My scepticism is tied first of all to my ignorance of Islam. Second, what I know of the 
history of Islam is not in itself more reassuring than the history of any other religion. 
And third, Islam, Shiite Islam in Iran, is not for that matter a sort of, shall we say, direct 
emanation from the time of the prophet. There’s a history. The Shiite clergy have been 
linked to a whole range of forms of institutionalization, ethnic domination, massacres, 
political and other sorts of privileges, etc. It’s probable that the culture and education of 
the Shiite clergy is not very high. Given all that, I believe we should be a bit distrustful. 
But once again, that’s a problem for Muslims; it’s not mine. The problem for Muslims is 
to know if, on the basis of this cultural background and the current situation and general 
context, it’s possible to draw from Islam and Islamic culture something like a new politi-
cal form. That’s a problem that belongs to Muslims, and I believe it’s the problem that a 
certain number of them, at least, among the most enlightened intellectuals, were quite 
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intensely trying to resolve. It’s that problem that Ali Shariati tried to pose.13 It’s what, it 
seems to me, was on Bazargan’s mind when I spoke to him. It was also Shariatmadari’s 
preoccupation. And I believe that the kind of attention, at once intense, mute, and full of 
apprehension, with which the Muslims I know in France are following the events in Iran 
is linked to the fact that if Iran fails, that is, if it falls apart into an authoritarian, retro-
grade, [inaudible], etc. regime of the mullahs, won’t that then be the sign—or one of the 
signs at any rate—that resources for a new form of political society cannot be drawn 
from Islam, from Islamic culture? If Iran succeeds, then… Because what struck me was 
that if the French papers and the French in general said and showed so much hostility to 
what was happening in Iran, Muslims in Europe were quiet; they didn’t speak much.  
FS: But they were following what was happening sympathetically.  
MF: Yes, I think they were following it sympathetically. But I believe that their silence 
was linked to the fact that they felt that the game that was playing out in Iran was very 
big, very important.  
FS: And yet if…  
MF: They must be seeing what’s currently happening in Iran with a lot of, well, not 
rancour, but concern and bitterness.  
FS: Oh, about that, I wanted—but I don’t think it’s worth it any more—to ask you a question 
about the particular role of Shiism as a doctrine and a form of organization, even if it’s not your 
domain. Well, let’s go from there to a question a bit more general but linked to the first: in the 
context of French opinion, the theme of Islam is already poorly seen. How do you explain this 
incomprehension about the Iranian uprising and what you call the fear of what’s irreducible in 
it? That is, with that we move, don’t we, to the idea of the irreducible.  
MF: You mean in Islam?  
FS: No, in the uprising.  
MF: Ah, in the uprising. Oh yes, yes definitely!  
FS: It’s an idea that you give in your latest article in Le Monde.14  
MF: Yes, right.  
FS: It’s an uprising where people are risking their lives—that aspect…  
                                                        
13 [Editors’ note: the sociologist Ali Shariati was a member of the National Front and one of the founders of 
the Freedom Movement of Iran. He was one of the most influential Iranian intellectuals of the twentieth 
century and, even if he died in 1977, he is considered the ‘ideologue’ of the Iranian Revolution. See Fou-
cault, “À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?”, 693/“What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?”, 207–208.] 
14 See Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever?”, 791/“Is It Useless to Revolt?”, 263.  
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MF: Yes. OK, well, I… What I meant was that, of course, an uprising always has its 
reasons and its explanations, and trust me, if you’re a historian of a Marxist bent, you 
lay out the conditions, the pressures, the reasons for which people rise up. All that [in-
audible] valuable [inaudible], but it’s not what I… Well, I mean that to grasp the moment 
where it’s happening, when one tries to grasp the very lived experience [vécu] of the 
revolution, then there’s something that cannot be brought back to an explanation or a 
reason. As miserable as people are, as threatened by dying from hunger as they may be, 
at the moment where they stand up and say: ‘I prefer to die by machine gun fire than to 
die of hunger’—at that moment there’s something that the threat of famine doesn’t ex-
plain. Right: there is, you could say, a play [jeu] between sacrifice and hope for which 
each person, and a people collectively, is responsible. It establishes the degree of hope 
and of the acceptance of sacrifices that will allow a people to confront an army, a police 
[inaudible]. And that was, I believe, a quite singular phenomenon, one that disrupted 
history… Is it [the tape recorder] not working? 
FS: Yes, it is, but I think we’re getting to the end.  
MF: Yes… Oh, but, there’s still more… We’re only halfway.  
FS: OK. Why is European opinion incapable of taking that, in the sense of a boxer taking a 
blow?  
MF: We could imagine that after the great… Because ultimately Europe lived, Euro-
pean [inaudible] lived off the principle of hope that was organized around the idea of a 
political revolution with parties, an army, an avant-garde, the proletariat, etc. Well, we 
know what deception that leads to. You could think that now, every form of uprising, 
whatever or wherever, as soon as it no longer treats these old forms as missions, [inaudi-
ble] hope, provokes at once a sort of irritation and you could even say a kind of cultural 
jealousy. They won’t be able to bring about a real revolution of their own form, without 
us, since we have never been able to bring about the revolution according to our own 
form. We who invented the idea of revolution, we who elaborated it, we who have or-
ganized an entire body of knowledge, a political system, an entire mechanism of politi-
cal parties, etc. around this idea of revolution. Well, you could give that as an explana-
tion. I’m not sure it’s true.  
FS: In any case, your explanation would be true for certain organizations, but it’s not true for 
the shock troops of anti-Iranianism?  
MF: Yes.  
FS: It would be true for the communists, for people on the left. Not for the right.  
MF: Oh, no, of course not, but then again there you could say that they’re generally 
hostile to every form of uprising.  
FS: Well, if you don’t mind, let’s move on now to another thing. It’s a bit more general, and 
we’ve already brought it up: the idea of an uprising [soulèvement]. You speak of the enigma of 
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the uprising and you say that it’s a matter of something outside of history. You write: ‘The man 
who rises up is without explanation’.15 What do you mean by that? And why would it not be, as 
in La Boétie, the ‘man who obeys’ who constitutes the problem?  
MF: You’re right, but [laughter], I’d say… [Silence] Yes, right, you’re asking a very se-
rious, a very important question. Well, I’m going to answer it, without, however, being 
sure that my answer is the right one and without being sure that I’ll always hold to it. I 
feel that ultimately you can find a thousand reasons why a man obeys and submits; you 
might even find me quite bluntly Hegelian: after all, that the slave prefers life to death 
and that he accepts slavery in order to continue to live, after all, isn’t that the mechanism 
of all servitude? On the other hand, it strikes me as enigmatic, because it runs absolutely 
counter to the kind of obvious and simple calculation that consists in saying: I prefer to 
die rather than to die… I prefer to die by bullet than to die here, I prefer to die today by 
rising up rather than to vegetate under the goblet of the master for whom I am [inaudi-
ble]. Well, this dying rather than vegetating, this other death… 
FS: In short, to die rather than to vegetate?  
MF: Yes, well, finally, choosing death, possible death is something that implies, with 
respect to every habit, familiarity, calculation, acceptance, etc. that makes up the web of 
daily existence… it seems to me that this implies a rupture. And once again I think it’s 
quite good and quite right that historians, economists, sociologists, those who analyse 
[inaudible] a society, I think it’s good that all of these people explain the reasons, the mo-
tives, the themes, the conditions in which things unfolded. But once again the very ges-
ture of rising up seems to me to be irreducible to these analyses. Indeed, when I said that 
it was outside history, I didn’t mean that it was outside of time, I mean that it was out-
side of this group of analyses that we need to carry out, of course, but that never account 
entirely for an uprising…  
FS: And on that point I see either a development in your analysis or two different levels. You 
speak a bit of François Furet and his analysis of the French Revolution: there were, for one, eco-
nomic and social reasons for it that led to reforms later on.16 There was the fact of the revolution; 
that’s one plane. And when you posit the idea of uprising, the inexplicable—that’s another plane? 
Or, is it the same plane?  
MF: I believe it’s the same plane. I believe that this raises the problem, shall we say, of 
the revolutionary event. For a certain time in France, historians haven’t liked the notion 
of the event [événement]. Their problem has been to reduce it. No, we need to come back 
to it. [Silence] A revolution is an event. It’s an event that is lived by people. So, there 
came a moment where the French were conscious that they were making a revolution. 
                                                        
15 [Translator’s note: the sentence in Foucault’s article reads: “Et parce que l’homme qui se lève est finale-
ment sans explication” (Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever?”, 791). “The man in revolt is ultimately inexpli-
cable” is the translation suggested by de Bruin and Anderson in “Is It Useless to Revolt?”, 263. See note 2.] 
16 [Editors’ note: see François Furet, Penser la Révolution française (1978)/François Furet, Interpreting the 
French Revolution (1981). Foucault refers to this book in “L’esprit d’un monde sans esprit”, 745/“Iran: The 
Spirit of a World without Spirit”, 252.]  
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And they made a revolution because they were conscious that they were doing so. That 
they were in the midst of doing something. Something that was politically important, 
that broke the old structures, etc. When they listened to a speech by Danton, when they 
rallied to the Jacobins, when they invaded the Assembly… Well, in Iran in 1978, when 
people went out into the streets, they knew that they were doing something, that what 
they were doing was a revolution or that it was an uprising, that it was at any rate a 
suspension of an entire part of their history.  
FS: But isn’t the decision to risk one’s life something different from acting in a play?  
MF: Of course, but what form this decision will take is, I also believe, one of the prob-
lems. Deciding to die when you’re waging a revolution doesn’t simply mean standing in 
front of a machine gun and waiting for it to fire. Deciding that you’re going to die or that 
you prefer to die rather than to continue, well that takes a certain number of forms. It 
can take the form of organizing a commando or guerrillas; it can also be the form of an 
individualised attack; it can be in the form of belonging to a mass movement; it can be 
the form of a religious demonstration, a funeral parade, etc. I’ll call all this the drama-
turgy of revolutionary lived experience [vécu], and we need to study it. And this drama-
turgy is the visible expression of that kind of decision that makes a rupture in historical 
continuities, and a rupture that is the heart of the revolution.  
FS: And so you assign an important role to consciousness in history.  
MF: Well, yeah.  
FS: The consciousness of the masses.  
MF: Yes, absolutely.  
FS: Well, here’s a question that follows from the first. In your works, you seem to start with 
apparatuses of power, for which Castoriadis constantly reproaches you with a real rancour.17 I 
think it’s first in an interview granted to Les révoltes logiques that you came to speak of the 
plebs [plèbe].18 Doesn’t the element of uprising or revolt erupt from the exterior in your work, 
and could we say that the Iranian uprising has played a role in the use of this term?  
                                                        
17 [Editors’ note: see Cornelius Castoriadis, “Les divertisseurs,” Le Nouvel Observateur 658 (1977), reprinted 
in La société française (1979).]  
18 “No doubt it would be mistaken to conceive the plebs [plèbe] as the permanent ground of history, the 
final objective of all subjections, the ever smouldering centre of all revolts. The plebs is no doubt not a real 
sociological entity. But there is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individ-
uals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more 
or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge. 
There is certainly no such thing as “the” plebs; rather there is, as it were, a certain plebeian quality or as-
pect [“de la” plebe]. There is plebs in bodies, in souls, in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, 
but everywhere in a diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and irreducibilities” (Michel Foucault, 
“Pouvoirs et strategies,” Les révoltes logiques 4 (1977), reprinted in DE 2, 421/“Power and Strategies,” in 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (1980), 137–138. 
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MF: Listen, people are really, really strange. They never let you speak about anything 
other than what they themselves talk about [laughter]. When I talk of apparatuses [dis-
positifs] of power, I’m trying to study how they function in a society. I’ve never claimed 
that these apparatuses of power constitute the entirety of the life of a society. I’ve never 
claimed that they exhaust a society’s history. I simply mean that, since they’re what I’m 
studying, I want to know how they function. In this respect, it seems to me that the 
analyses of power carried out by many of the people you mentioned, people who in-
voke, for example, the state, or a social class, absolutely do not give an account of the 
complexity of the functioning of this phenomenon of power.  
FS: But all the same, between the fact that you describe a mechanism of power, or an appa-
ratus, and the fact that you show how (currently, for example, in the course on sexuality or in 
your latest interview that appeared in L’Arc)19 power isn’t repressive but political when it comes 
to knowledge or to desire—well that is something much more interior, more inherent…  
MF: Yes, but…  
FS: …than in Discipline and Punish, let’s say.  
MF: Well, yes… Indeed, in these recent texts… In Discipline and Punish, I tried to 
study the mechanism of disciplinary power. It was important, so it seems to me, at least 
in the societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In more recent texts, I’ve tried 
first of all to revisit the problem of power more generally. I’ve tried to show that power 
is in fact always a relational structure. Power isn’t something that exists as a substance 
or as a property stocked up by a social class. Nor is power a kind of capacity that would 
be produced by an apparatus such as the state. In reality, there are relations of power, 
relations of power between people, between agents, where each person is in a different 
and dissymmetrical position. But when one says that power is a relation, that means that 
there are two terms, that means that the modification of one of the two terms will 
change the relation. That’s to say that, far from constituting a kind of structure of im-
prisonment, power is a network of mobile, changing, modifiable and very often fragile 
relations. That’s what I meant. So, people like Castoriadis clearly have understood abso-
lutely nothing. All right, we won’t gather up all of their objections. We’d have to stoop 
too low.  
FS: Yes, well… But it was only to see how you linked things up, and thus one could say that 
you start with Ernst Bloch, but won’t the event of Iran theoretically inflect…  
MF: No, no, on the contrary. You could say that I believe a relation of power is a dy-
namic relation and indeed one that defines up to a certain point the position of the part-
ners. But the position of the partners and the attitude of the partners, the activity of the 
partners, equally modifies the relation of power. Put differently, what I wanted to show 
                                                        
19 Michel Foucault, “Vérité et pouvoir,” L’Arc 70 (1977), 16–26. [Translator’s note: this text is an abridge-
ment of an interview that first appeared in Italian in Microfisica del potere (1977). The complete French ver-
sion can be found as “Entretien avec Michel Foucault,” in DE 2, 140–160. An English translation from the 
complete Italian version can be found as “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge, 109–133.] 
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is simply that there isn’t power on the one hand and then the people to whom power is 
applied on the other, because with a hypothesis like that, either you have to admit that 
power is all powerful or you have to admit that it’s totally powerless. In fact, that’s nev-
er true. Power isn’t always either all powerful or impotent. It’s blind for the most part, 
but it sees a certain number of things all the same. Quite simply because the question is 
how to make sense of the strategic relations between individuals who pursue objectives, 
stand together, partially limit the possibility of action of the partner even as the partner 
escapes from them, and from all of this a new tactic emerges, etc. It is this mobility that 
we have to try to make sense of. And just as there are moments where there arise what 
you might call a phenomenon of consonance in which power is stabilised and where 
there really is, in sum, a subjugation, an acceptance of the mechanism of domination in a 
society, so too are there other moments where the consonance arises in the opposite di-
rection, and where, on the contrary, at those moments, the entire network of power is 
upset.  
FS: In history such as you describe it, there are powers—well, here I’m using the terms you 
use in the article in Le Monde—there are powers that you say are infinite but not all powerful. 
There are uprisings that are irreducible and there are rights that you also call universal laws.20 
Can you explain the nature and foundations, be they biological, rational, economic, of these three 
manifestations or authorities… what could they be called? What is the concept that could group 
together power, right and uprising?  
MF: I’ll say this: let’s take systems like our own, containing states with their apparat-
uses, with a whole series of techniques to be exercised in order to be able to govern peo-
ple. The proliferation of power mechanisms, and consequently also the way they’re sta-
bilised through their multiplication and their refinement, guarantees that there’s always, 
you might say, a tendency to govern too much. It’s as though there’s a law of excess in-
terior to the development of power.  
FS: That would be in the institution?  
MF: That would be in the institution. 
FS: Before being in desire…  
MF: Yes, well, let’s say that the institution and the desire of individuals function then 
as multipliers of each other. OK. And to that extent I think that one of the fundamental 
roles of the intellectual is precisely to assert, over and against those who govern, general 
limits not to be crossed. These are the guarantee of a non-excess, in any case the always 
provisory and always fragile guarantee that must be defended: a threatened frontier!  
                                                        
20 [Editors’ note: see Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever?”, 794/“Is It Useless to Revolt?”, 266: “The power that 
a man exerts over another is always dangerous. I am not saying that power, by nature, is evil. I am saying 
that power by its mechanisms is infinite (which does not mean that it is all-powerful, on the contrary). The 
rules limiting it will never be rigorous enough. Universal principles are never strict enough to take away 
from it all the opportunities that it seizes. Inviolable laws and unrestricted rights must always be opposed 
to power.”] 
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FS: But what are those rights, laws, that universal? Reason? Kant? Monotheism? Here you’re 
adding a notion, aren’t you, between the notion of power and that of uprising, the notion of 
rights, and you haven’t explained its origins in your own point of view. What are rights? What is 
the universal? What is the law?  
MF: Well, this universal I’m speaking about is, once again, the indispensable correla-
tive to every system of power that takes hold in a given society. If there isn’t a limit, 
well, it’s universally true that you end up heading toward domination, despotism, the 
servitude of individuals, etc., etc. So, against this universal that is a fact of power, we 
need to oppose another universal that will take on entirely different forms depending 
upon the power we’re dealing with, but that will mark each time the limit that is not to 
be crossed.  
FS: So this universal, it carries the mark of what it opposes, it doesn’t exist in itself; it is al-
ways the product of specific cases.  
MF: Yes, you could say that, at any rate it’s not…  
FS: I mean, is there no ‘Thou shalt not kill’ to give an example? But in each specific case, there 
are limits for the law at which it must stop. How then do we define them?  
MF: Human rights [les droits de l’homme], you might say, rights in general, have a his-
tory. There are no universal rights. But it’s a universal fact that there are rights. And it’s 
universal that there must be rights. For if we don’t oppose a right to the fact of govern-
ment, if we don’t oppose a right to the mechanisms and apparatuses of power, then they 
cannot but get carried away, they will never restrain themselves.  
FS: So rights are purely negative? They restrain—they’re not something positive?  
MF: No, no, well, here I’m talking about those rights that are currently called human 
rights. Human rights and positive rights or laws [le droit positif], a system of law, for ex-
ample, the legal regime of a given society—these aren’t the same thing. Our systems of 
law in the West have tried to present themselves as logically deriving from the funda-
mental affirmation of human rights. In fact, that’s not true. Positive law is a certain 
number of techniques, procedures, rules for procedures, obligations, prescriptions, pro-
hibitions, etc. These aren’t human rights. Besides, many legislators have perfectly under-
stood what Bentham meant when he said of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen, the Declaration of the French Revolution: ‘But these French revolution-
aries are asses, they haven’t realised that from the moment where…’  
[Interruption in the recording. The cassette side is changed.]  
MF: Even a law voted by the people as a whole, from the moment that it obligates 
someone to something, will encroach on human rights. Indeed, a system of law, of posi-
tive laws in a society, and human rights are heterogeneous to one another. Human 
rights, once again, are that form of the universal that is never defined in a specific form. 
They’re that with which one can mark out for a government its limit.  
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FS: But what are they a product of? Reason?  
MF: Well, I’d say no, they’re a product of the will.  
FS: So, shall we move on to the notion of uprising.  
MF: Do you want something to drink? I’m dying of thirst.  
FS: Uh, sure, if you’d like [laughter].  
[Interruption in the recording.]  
FS: Desire then… What brings about an uprising? A decision, perhaps?  
MF: Yes, a will.  
FS: Could it also be a biological force?  
MF: Have you noticed that this thing which is, how should we put it, polycultural—
and you yourself know the scene over here in France well—have you noticed that this 
notion of the will is something that we never talk about at the present in French culture? 
We speak of reason, of desire.  
FS: Yes, it’s a bit abandoned as a concept.  
MF: Yes, a bit abandoned.  
FS: They gave us a real headache in the last year of high school,21 didn’t they, telling us that 
the will is a synthesis.  
MF: That’s right.  
FS: Once you no longer define it as a synthesis, you…  
MF: Well there, you know, I can’t tell you much because I have a slow mind. But for a 
certain number of months and years even, it’s seemed to me that to do the analysis of 
power relations appropriately requires bringing in the problem of the will. Relations of 
power are, of course, entirely invested by desires, by schemas of rationality, but they 
also put various wills into play.  
FS: That is to say, a synthesis. 
MF: No, I’d say that the will is perhaps precisely that thing which, beyond every cal-
culation of interest and beyond the immediacy of desire, of what there is of the immedi-
ate in desire, the will is that which can say: ‘I prefer to die.’ There you have it. And that’s 
the test [épreuve] of death.  
                                                        
21 [Translator’s note: en classe terminale. French high school students typically take at least one year of phi-
losophy courses.] 
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FS: The highest test, or the one we constantly face? When you say, for example, ‘the will to 
know’…?  
MF: No, no, it’s the terminal and extreme form, what shows itself in the naked state 
when one says: ‘I prefer to die.’  
FS: So, it’s a purely irrational decision?  
MF: No, no, not at all, it doesn’t have any need to be. Nor does it need to be empty of 
all desire. There’s a moment where, you could say, subjectivity, the subject… You could 
say that the will is what sets for a subject his or her own position. That’s it.  
FS: The will is what sets for a subject his or her position, his or her own position.  
MF: The will, it’s the person who says: ‘I prefer to die.’ The will is what says: ‘I prefer 
to be a slave.’ The will is what says: ‘I want to know’, etc.  
FS: But what’s the difference here between will and subjectivity?  
MF: Oh, I’d say that, well, the will is the pure act of the subject. And the subject is 
what is set and determined by an act of will. In fact, the two notions are reciprocal, 
aren’t they, for a certain number of things.  
FS: And with that don’t we fall back into the forms of idealism that your studies have dissipat-
ed [laughter]?  
MF: Why would that be idealist?  
FS: It a bit like the concept of man…  
MF: [Silence] No, because…  
FS: It’s very Hegelian, isn’t it?  
MF: I’d say instead that it’s Fichtean.  
FS: I don’t know Fichte well.  
MF: You might say that what I criticised in the notion of man, and in the humanism 
of the 1950s and 1960s, was the use of a universal grasped as a universal-notion. There 
would be a human nature, human needs, an essence of man, etc. And it’s in the name of 
this universal of man that people would make revolutions, would abolish exploitation, 
would nationalise industry, and that they should join the Communist party, etc. This 
universal that allows a bunch of things and that presupposes at the same time, in a 
somewhat naïve way, a kind of trans-historical or sub-historical or meta-historical per-
manence of man. I believe that that view isn’t rationally acceptable, nor is it acceptable 
practically. I believe that you escape from universalism when you say at last that the 
subject is nothing other than… the effect of a… well, than what is determined by a will. 
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A will is the activity of the subject. Truth be told, I suppose that the person I’m ap-
proaching at full speed—and not for his humanism, but precisely for his conception of 
freedom—is Sartre. And Fichte. Since Sartre and Fichte… Sartre isn’t Hegelian.  
FS: When I mention Hegel, I’m thinking of the beginning of the ‘Self-Consciousness’ section 
of The Phenomenology of Spirit.  
MF: Yes, that’s right, indeed, he speaks of Fichte, or he’s quite close to Fichte.  
FS: And yes indeed in Being and Nothingness, it’s a question of being for death. Well, there, 
the two questions intersect, no? You write: ‘To be respectful when a singularity rises up and in-
transigent as soon as power violates the universal.’22 Would the duty of the intellectual be to op-
pose the existing powers when the uprising is in a position of weakness and to press for what you 
call ‘respecting’ the uprising when it’s in a position of force? And isn’t anti-strategic morality (of 
course, for newspaper readers, we’ll have to define this word) perpetually destabilizing, since it 
provides a support for endless uprisings without final purpose? And isn’t Hegel, as you say in 
your inaugural lecture,23 waiting for you at the end of the road [laughter]? By positing an anti-
strategic morality, aren’t you in fact against power when it’s strong and for the uprising when 
it’s strong, thus…  
MF: Did I say that? I wrote that somewhere?  
FS: No, what you wrote is just: ‘To be respectful when a singularity rises up and intransigent 
as soon as power violates the universal.’ But when there’s an uprising in Iran, you support it and 
when Mr. Peyrefitte makes new laws, you’re opposed to them,24 but…  
MF: I… I’m not for an uprising when it’s strong, solely when it’s strong, and not 
when it’s weak. When someone shouts in the depths of a prison, I’m also on his side.  
FS: Of course. But there you seek above all to stop the power that strikes out at him. And 
when there’s an uprising in force, it commands your respect. Is yours definitively then a concep-
tion of something that’s always destabilizing, and thus strategic? If the way I’ve put the problem 
is false, you can correct it.  
MF: In the article you’re alluding to, what I tried to do wasn’t necessarily to define 
the position of the intellectual, because, after all, I don’t see why I should lay down the 
law for intellectuals; I’ve never laid down the law for anyone. Ultimately, what I was 
trying to do is what I had in my head. I’ve often been criticised for not having a politics 
and for not saying, for example, well, here’s how prisons should function or here’s how 
mental illness should be treated. I never say that. And I say that it’s not my job to. And 
                                                        
22 [Translator’s note: Michel Foucault, “Is It Useless to Revolt?”, 267, translation modified (see DE 2, 797).] 
23 [Translator’s note: that is, the inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, “L’ordre du discours,” pub-
lished in English as “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert J. 
C. Young (1981), 48–78.] 
24 [Editors’ note: see Michel Foucault, “Manières de justice,” Le Nouvel Observateur 743 (1979), 20–21, re-
printed in DE 2, 755–759.] 
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why isn’t it my job? Well, because I think that if the intellectual is to be, as Husserl says, 
the functionary of the universal, it’s precisely not in taking a dogmatic, prophetic or leg-
islative position. The intellectual doesn’t have to be the legislator or to make laws or to 
say what’s going to happen. I believe that the intellectual’s role is in fact to show, per-
petually, how what seems to go without saying in what makes up our daily life is in fact 
arbitrary and fragile, and that we can always rise up. And that there are always and eve-
rywhere reasons not to accept reality as it’s given and proposed to us. I don’t know how 
a certain number of commentators and critics, more the critics than the commentators, 
you might say, came to the idea that for me, given that things are as they are, they can’t 
be changed. Whereas I’m doing entirely the opposite. For example, what I say about 
madness: let’s look at this thing that is announced to us as a scientifically established 
truth: the existence of mental illness, the mentally ill, their typology, etc. In fact, look a 
bit at what that rests on, and you’ll find a whole series of social, economic, political, etc. 
practices that are historically situated. And consequently it’s all very fragile. My project, 
I believe that it’s one of the possible roles—if not, what good are intellectuals?—my pro-
ject is in fact to multiply everywhere, indeed wherever it’s possible, to multiply the oc-
casions to rise up against the real that is given us, and to rise up, not strictly or always in 
the form of the Iranian uprising, with fifteen million people in the street. You can rise up 
or revolt [se soulever] against a type of family relationship, against a sexual relationship, 
against a form of pedagogy, against a type of information.  
FS: It’s a strategy of uprising then.  
MF: It’s a strategy of uprising. But not of global, universal, and massive uprising in 
the form: ‘We’re sick of this rotten society, let’s throw it all out.’ It’s a differentiated and 
analytical uprising that shows which elements of reality are proposed to us as self-
evident, natural, obvious and necessary in a civilization. I’ve tried to show how much 
they are actually historically recent, fragile, and so mobile, and so something we can rise 
up against [soulevables].  
FS: And so as you’ve explained, this is a notion of perpetual uprising that would be definitive-
ly without any finality, any temporal end, without finality since it would be anti-strategic?  
MF: I mean that I think that from the moment where everything that gives us occa-
sion to rise up, everything that appears intolerable, everything that people want to 
change—well, from the moment where someone proposes a global and general formula 
such as: ‘I can rid you of all that by fixing for you what you’ll have to accept afterwards’, 
I’d say the game’s rigged. People must invent both what they can and will rise up 
against and what they’ll transform their uprising into. Or what they’ll direct this upris-
ing toward. It’s to be reinvented indefinitely. I really don’t see any final point in this 
kind of history. I mean that I don’t see the moment where people will no longer have to 
rise up. One could even predict that the forms of uprising will no longer be the same: 
think of those great uprisings, for example, of the peasant masses, dying of hunger in 
the Middle Ages, who went off to burn the fortified castles, etc. It’s probable that in the 
Western countries, the advanced industrial countries, as people say, those kinds of re-
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volts won’t happen again. Things are different now. So, uprisings change forms, but to 
have to rise up… You know, when you take, for example, uprisings by homosexuals in 
the United States, and when you compare them to the huge uprisings that can happen in 
a country in the Third World where people are dying of hunger, or what might have 
happened in the Middle Ages, then what’s happening in the United States might seem 
trivial. But I’d say it isn’t trivial. Not because some uprisings have a marvellous value 
that others don’t, but rather because there can’t be, and we shouldn’t wish there to be, 
societies without uprisings. There you have it.  
FS: And now we’ve come back a bit to the relationship between uprising and religion. You set 
up a link of affinity, to use a somewhat Hegelian term that Deleuze also uses, between uprising as 
mode of history and religious forms. At a certain moment you speak of rising up as putting one’s 
life in danger, and it’s quite close to what can be best expressed in religious terms.  
MF: Yes, well, I haven’t grasped your question fully…  
FS: I mean, uprisings as such, a voluntary uprising, where one risks one’s life, is an uprising 
carried out not in order to improve living conditions, for example. Instead, it’s something done in 
the name of an eschatology or a radical change. What relationship is there then between these two 
poles of religion and uprising? And is the relationship permanent?  
MF: Oh, it’s absolutely not permanent. Well, there are forms of religion and moments 
in the history of the relations between society and religions where religion can play that 
role but doesn’t. Catholicism in Europe in the nineteenth century offered practically no 
possibilities, holds or expressions for an uprising. But on the other hand, once again, in 
the fifteenth century, you could say that it was an intensification of religious life, and a 
profound desire on the part of a certain number of individuals to get access to a form of 
religious life that made it upset both ecclesiastical and political institutions and their 
social role. Finally, it depends… Let me ask you a question off the record: is this for a 
newspaper or for a journal?  
FS: Yes, it’s a weekly.  
MF: You know that we’ve already got 30 pages?  
FS: Really? I didn’t know…  
MF: Yes, it’s your first interview, but we’ve already got way too much.  
FS: Oh really? But it’s because it’s interesting…  
MF: Was there anything in the questions you asked, were there things…  
[Interruption in the recording.]  
MF: No, but you know, I think you’re right, because in spite of everything, it’s some-
thing that, that… I don’t know… If I didn’t answer, it’s because, you know, sometimes 
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I’m disarmed. I’m not a journalist. Even when I write for the newspapers, I write a bit as 
though I were writing a book [inaudible]. That is, I pay attention a bit to what I’m saying. 
I don’t write at four in the morning, in fifteen minutes. Well, when I say that what I saw 
seemed to me to prove that the Iranians were searching for something like a political 
spirituality, which is something no longer familiar to us, it seems to me that the sentence 
is clear and that there’s no arguing it. When you have to deal with people such as 
Claude Roy or others who manipulate the text and who say: ‘Foucault aspires to a politi-
cal spirituality’, you’re dealing with such a degree of lies, of bad faith, that you know 
that if you try to send a reply or a corrective, it’ll be read in the same way. There will be 
new falsifications, etc. So I was quiet for a certain time. I let all of that settle down. And 
then one day, in an article, in a book, I’ll sum it all up, and I’ll show it’s a web of lies. I 
don’t want to enter into polemics with people whose lack of intelligence and whose bad 
faith are on display everywhere. That being said, maybe I was wrong, maybe it’s neces-
sary, each time someone says something silly…  
FS: Oh, no, it’s not worth it. But now there’s this whole drama that began last year of the 
Nouvelle Philosophie, with which you were involved at the beginning, but now you’re recant-
ing…  
MF: No, no, no, I never recanted because I was never part of it, I simply said…  
FS: But you said somewhere that you have been more involved than you wanted to be.  
MF: Oh, no, definitely not.  
FS: Either in Le Nouvel Obsérvateur or in L’Arc.  
MF: Listen, I don’t think so.  
FS: You don’t want to be mixed up…  
MF: I might have said that I didn’t want to be mixed up with them, but I just wrote 
one thing. It was an article on Glucksmann’s book, which, I believe, is important.25 And 
especially two of his books… well at least La cuisinière et le mangeur d’hommes seemed to 
me, at that moment, to be a very important book that wasn’t getting the chance it de-
served.26 Well, when the second book appeared, I said to myself: OK, this time let’s not 
pass up the book. It so happened that it had a real echo, and that I didn’t need… but 
Glucksmann’s book raised some problems for me. That’s all. OK, Glucksmann was con-
sidered a Nouveau Philosophe, but he denies it. Ultimately, I don’t give a damn, 
Glucksmann’s books interest me; the other books by those who are called the Nouveaux 
Philosophes don’t. Or so little that after going through a few, I stopped reading them. I 
don’t give a damn. I really don’t care. I feel it’s not my business. So I really can’t get in-
                                                        
25 Michel Foucault, “La grande colère des faits,” Le Nouvel Observateur (1977), reprinted in DE 2, 277–281. 
The article discusses Glucksmann’s Les maîtres penseurs (1977)/The Master Thinkers (1980). 
26 André Glucksmann, La cuisinière et le mangeur d’hommes. Essai sur l’État, le marxisme et les camps de concen-
tration (1975), cited by Foucault in “Pouvoirs et strategies”, 421.  
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volved. But it’s true that because I’d said that Glucksmann’s book was interesting for the 
problems of… well… oh, but all that is really toxic! Once again, either you end up polic-
ing people who write stupid things, and then you spend your whole day doing that, or 
you let them slide, now with the drawback that then people feel free to say absolutely 
anything at all. And that is one of the political and moral problems that I haven’t re-
solved.  
FS: Anyway, in your latest article in Le Monde, a good deal of problems were raised that 
would merit greater reflection.  
MF: Yes. But if that’s what you want, I’m never very sure of what I’m advancing, and 
I’d really like to be able to exchange and discuss with people who don’t agree with me 
and who can show their disagreement and ask their questions. But from the moment 
you run up against people who act only like prosecutors and who denounce you as the 
enemy, as a sell-out, as an agent of someone… What do you do? Or the people who 
tamper with the texts and who put you on trial with doctored files. In reality, for all the-
se things I wrote about Iran, I really regret not having been able and not having had 
chances to have extended discussions with Iranians or simply with Muslims. Maybe I’m 
wrong, but I wish people would attribute to me exactly what I said and not anything 
else.  
FS: You distinguish two types of intellectuals. On the one hand, the universal intellectual, 
whom you present sometimes as the heir of the Marxist vision of the proletariat and sometimes as 
the heir of the man of justice and of the law. And you prophesise a bit—it’s somewhat complicat-
ed—the death of this type of intellectual. On the other hand, there’s the specific intellectual who 
develops starting in 1945.27 Don’t the recent stands you’ve taken on Iran and the war in Vietnam 
lead you back to a representation of the universal?  
MF: No. Well, you could say that by ‘universal intellectual’ and ‘specific intellectual’, 
I mean that… it seems to me, in a society like ours, at least, in the West, in Europe, that 
the intellectual doesn’t have to distance himself from his knowledge, from, let’s say, his 
specialty, in order to play a political role. He doesn’t have to set himself up as a prophet 
of humanity in general. It’s enough, I think, for him to look at what he does, what’s 
happening in what he’s doing. That’s where we meet back up again with this conception 
of uprising I was just talking about. The idea that the role of the intellectual is to show 
how this reality that’s presented to us as self-evident and taken for granted is in fact 
fragile. And whether it’s the physicist in his laboratory, the historian of early Christiani-
ty or the sociologist who studies a society, it seems to me that all of these people can per-
fectly well make the points of fragility of what is self-evident, of the real, appear to us, 
and they can do that from what is most specialised in their specialty, the most specific in 
their knowledge. Well, it’s true that you might ask what right I have then to talk about 
Iran or Vietnam. Well, I don’t think I’m leaving the position of a specific intellectual 
                                                        
27 [Editors’ note: see Michel Foucault, “La function politique de l’intellectuel,” Politique Hebdo (1976), 31–33, 
reprinted in DE 2, 109–114/“The Political Function of the Intellectual,” Radical Philosophy 17 (1977), 12–14.] 
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when I say that I, insofar as I’m one of the governed, hold that there are a number of 
things that a government must not do.28  
FS: No matter the government…  
MF: Right, no matter the government. Put differently, it’s not the universal of the 
human being, you might say, but rather the generality of what happens in the relations 
between those who govern and those who are governed that allows anyone to speak 
about these problems.  
FS: It’s a little specious... 	
MF: It’s a little specious... 	
FS: Voltaire could call himself a specific intellectual.  
MF: Yes, but I really think that there, if you look at people from the eighteenth centu-
ry, it was always in that way that they went about things, starting from something en-
tirely specific. To put it differently, when I speak of the universal intellectual, I try to 
mark myself off from it...  
FS: For example, is Sartre, for you, the universal intellectual?  
MF: [Silence]  
FS: In fact, you’re talking especially about the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century. But I was thinking in particular about the period in France prior to the 1960s. 
You spoke of Hungary, of Poland.  
MF: Yes, yes, we’d have to talk about that. No, but I wanted to say that I’m getting 
really worn out.  
FS: I’m annoying you with my questions.  
MF: No, no, no, you’re asking a really interesting question. OK, what I meant is that 
the universal intellectual, if he wants to function as though he were the representative of 
a universal consciousness or as if he were, let’s say, involved in his activity as a writer 
and an intellectual in a way analogous to those political parties that claim to possess 
both the truth of history and the dynamics of the revolution—well, if that’s what you 
had in mind, I’d say: no, I don’t want them, those intellectuals of the universal who are 
only the doublets of political parties. On the other hand, the intellectual who can play 
the role of someone who makes social stabilities fragile, makes social, historical, political 
and economic immobilities fragile, from the intellectual work that he does... Oh, all 
right, I’m sorry, but I can’t do anymore!  
                                                        
28 [Editors’ note: on the idea of a ‘right of the governed’, see Michel Foucault, “Va-t-on extrader Klaus 
Croissant?” Le Nouvel Observateur 679 (1977), 62–63, reprinted in DE 2, 361–365.] 
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FS: Final question, but a bit in the form of a challenge, but it’ll be fun. I noticed that in the po-
sitions you’ve taken on Iran, you use the following terms: horror, drunkenness, beauty, gravity, 
dramaturgy, scene, theatre, Greek tragedy—you speak of the fascination of events. So, beyond 
technology and genealogy, beyond the political positions you’ve taken, would the rigorous Fou-
cault not be an artist of the era of Francis Bacon, of Rebeyrolle and of Stanley Kubrick?  
MF: Listen, you flatter me by saying that. I’ll simply add a little detail that you al-
ready know. In fact, people always say, I don’t know why, that I have the reputation of 
being a bit cold, dry, rigid, that I only talk about... But you shouldn’t confuse the person 
who speaks with what he’s speaking about. You shouldn’t confuse what one says about 
something and the meaning attached to speaking about that thing. If I dismantle, if I try 
to dismantle mechanisms of power as carefully as possible, if I try to show how relations 
of power actually have a kind of logic or connection that’s rather subtle, that gives them 
their force without taking away their fragility, that doesn’t mean that I’m linked affec-
tively or in a positive way to that kind of thing. After all, the book I wrote about mad-
ness can also come across as very lyrical, right?  
FS: Yes, in your style, no?  
MF: If I wrote that book on madness while trying to examine all those mechanisms, it 
wasn’t in a climate of indifference to mad subjectivity.  
FS: Yes.  
MF: It’s the same for crime and delinquency, etc. No, no, I don’t think that this vo-
cabulary that you’ve pointed out, a vocabulary that indeed is not very intellectualist, I 
don’t think that it’s something new. I don’t say that as a refusal of change; I’ve changed. 
But at present there’s a mode of conversion that’s really constraining; you have to con-
vert. Maybe I’ve converted, I’ve already changed a lot, but at any rate what you’ve 
picked up on doesn’t seem to me to be something absolutely new.  
FS: No, I’m not talking about novelty.  
MF: Oh, OK!  
FS: But just about these facts themselves.  
MF: OK, sure then.  
FS: An aesthetic way of approaching things.  
MF: Yes, that’s right.  
FS: There’s a side concerned with existence, it’s not new… OK, thank you.  
MF: I’m the one who should thank you.  
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